

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

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INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 VIENNA 0848

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP MEETING 30  
JANUARY 1974.

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. IN ITS MEETING ON JANUARY 30,  
THE AD HOC GROUP COVERED THE FOLLOWING AGENDA ITEMS:

A) REPORTS ON BILATERAL MEETINGS;

B) THE 31 JANUARY WESTERN PLENARY STATEMENT ON THE  
COMMON CEILING TO BE PRESENTED BY THE UK REPRESENTATIVE;

C) TELEGRAM FROM NATO REQUESTING AHG TIMING OF ITS  
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REQUIREMENTS FOR DETAILED GUIDANCE ON NEGOTIATED INSPECTION

MEASURES;

D) REPORT OF THE MILITARY WORKING GROUP ON 1968-1973 GROUND  
FORCE COMPARISONS.

AHG DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON THE REPORT ON THE US/USSR BILATERAL  
MEETING OF 29 JANUARY. DURING THIS MEETING, THE SOVIET RE-  
PRESENTATIVE INDICATED STRONG RELUCTANCE TO ENTER INTO  
INFORMAL MULTILATERAL CONTACTS WITH THE ALLIES FOR DIS-  
CUSSION PURPOSES, PUSHING STRONGLY FOR BILATERALS INSTEAD.  
END SUMMARY.

2. THE AD HOC GROUP CONSIDERED REPORTS ON THE FOLLOWING  
7 BILATERALS MEETINGS:

A) GREEK/ROMANIAN BILATERAL ON 29 JANUARY;

B) US/GDR BILATERAL ON 25 JANUARY;

C) US/POLISH BILATERAL ON 25 JANUARY;

D) US/ROMANIAN BILATERAL ON 28 JANUARY;

E) FRG/SOVIET BILATERAL ON 28 JANUARY;

F) FRG/GDR BILATERAL ON 29 JANUARY;

G) US/USSR BILATERAL ON 29 JANUARY.

3. IN REFERRING TO HIS MEETING WITH THE ROMANIAN DEPREP,  
THE GREEK REPRESENTATIVE NOTED THAT THE MAJOR ITEM OF INTEREST  
WAS THE REPLY OF THE SOVIET REP TO THE ROMANIAN EXPRESSION  
OF INTEREST REGARDING RELIANCE UPON INFORMAL MULTILATERAL  
MEETINGS FOR THE CONDUCT OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE ROMANIAN  
DEPREP POINTED OUT THAT KHESTOV HAD SAID THE PRESENT TIME  
WAS NOT A MATURE ONE FOR ENGAGING EXTENSIVELY IN SUCH MEETINGS  
BECAUSE THERE IS NOT ENOUGH COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THE TWO  
SIDES TO JUSTIFY THEM.

4. IN COMMENTING ON THE US-POLISH BILATERAL ON 25 JANUARY  
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(VIENNA 0718) THE US REP NOTED THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT  
PART OF THE BILATERAL MEETING WAS THE INDICATION OF POLISH  
OPPOSITION TO ALLIED CONCEPT THAT BOTH SIDES REACH A PRO-  
CEDURAL UNDERSTANDING TO FOCUS INITIALLY ON US-SOVIET GROUND  
FORCE REDUCTIONS.

5. THE NORWEGIAN REP ASKED THE US AND GREEK REPS IF IN THEIR  
CONVERSATIONS WITH THE ROMANIANS THE LATTER HAD OUTLINED A

MECHANISM FOR THE PRESENTATION OF THE VIEWS OF NEUTRALS IN THE MBFR FORUM. THE US DEP REP REPLIED THAT THE ROMANIANS HAD MENTIONED SUCH MECHANISM AND HAD NOTED THAT THE AUSTRIANS HAD EXPRESSED INTEREST IN OFFICIAL BRIEFINGS ON THE NEGOTIATIONS IN A STATEMENT AT CSCE. THE US DEP REP INFORMED THE ROMANIANS THAT THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS IN VIENNA HAD HEARD NO EXPRESSION OF INTEREST ON THE PART OF NEUTRAL STATES FOR FORMALIZED BRIEFING AND SAW NO NEED FOR IT. THE ROMANIANS HAD INDICATED THAT NOW THEY HAD REFINED THE DETAILS OF THEIR PROPOSAL, THEY WOULD BRING UP THE SUBJECT IN A FUTURE PLENARY PRESENTATION. THE NORWEGIAN REP COMMENTED THAT APPARENTLY THE ROMANANS HAD ALSO MISINTERPRETED A NORWEGIAN STATEMENT ISSUED IN GENEVA TO THE EFFECT THAT ALL PARTIES SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO COMMENT ON FORCE REDUCTION TALKS TAKING PLACE IN VIENNA. HE SAID THAT THE NORWEGIAN REMARKS DID NOT ENCOMPASS INVITING NEUTRALS INTO THE MBFR TALKS BUT MEANT ONLY THAT ANYONE AT CSCE COULD EXPRESS VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT.

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AMEMBASSY BONN

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 4 VIENNA 0848

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

6. IN REPORTING ON HIS 28 JANUARY MEETING WITH THE SOVIET REP AND DEP REP, THE FRG REP SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD SHOWN TEDIOUS INSISTENCE ON THE QUESTION OF WHY THE WESTERN EUROPEANS ARE NOT INTENT UPON REDUCING THEIR FORCES FROM THE OUTSET OF THE TALKS. HE SAID THE SOVIET REPS RAISED THIS ISSUE APPROXIMATELY 20 TIMES IN THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION AND THAT THEY WERE OBVIOUSLY NOT SATISFIED WITH THE FRG ANSWER. WHEREAS THE SOVIETS CLAIMED THAT THE WESTERN EUROPEAN ATTITUDES HAD CHANGED IN THE COURSE OF THE LAST YEAR, THE FRG REP ARGUED THAT IN FACT IT WAS THE SOVIET POSITION WHICH HAD CHANGED. PREVIOUSLY, HE SAID, THE SOVIETS HAD NOT OBJECTED TO THE CONCEPT OF PHASING. IN FACT, THEY HAD IN THE PAST EXPLICITLY CALLED FOR THE REDUCTION OF STATIONED FORCES AND FOREIGN BASES FIRST. IN RESPONSE TO THE ARGUMENT BY THE FRG REP THAT AIR FORCES STATIONED OUTSIDE OF THE NGA ARE JUST AS RELEVANT IN A EUROPEAN CONFLICT

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AS THOSE IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, THE SOVIET REP RESPONDED "WHY DON'T WE JUST WITHDRAW THEM TO THE EAST AND WEST THEN." THE QUESTION OF ASSOCIATED MEASURES WHICH WAS BROACHED BY THE FRG REP SEEMED TO EMBARRASS THE SOVIET REP.

7. THE FRG REP REPORTED THAT IN A 29 JANUARY MEETING WITH THE GDR REP, THE GDR REP HAD RAISED SAME POINT WHICH HAD SURFACED IN THE 28 JANUARY FRG/USSR BILATERAL. THE FRG REP ASKED WHY THE EAST WAS SINGLING OUT THE BUNDESWEHR. THE GDR REP RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT THE EAST WAS NOT INTENTIONALLY SINGLING OUT THE BUNDESWEHR, BUT DWELT ON THE BUNDESWEHR ISSUE SIPLY BECAUSE THEY ARE THE LARGEST ALLIED FORCE IN THE NGA. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE GDR REP QUESTIONED AS WHETHER IT WAS NECESSARY TO THE WEST TO SPECIFY THAT THE SOVIET TANK ARMY TO BE REDUCED SHOULD COME FROM THE GDR. HE SAID THAT EVERYONE KNOWS WHERE THE SOVIET TANK ARMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE ARE AND EMPHASIZED THAT THE GDR ITSELF WOULD NOT WANT TO BE SINGLED OUT IN ANY WAY. THE FRG REP CONCLUDED BY STATING HE POINTED OUT TO THE GDR REP THAT, IN CONTRAST TO NUMEROUS EASTERN STATEMENTS, THE BUNDESWEHR IS NOT 50 PERCENT OR MORE OF THE ALLIED FORCES IN THE NGA BUT LESS THAN 50 PERCENT.

8. IN DESCRIBING THE US-USSR DISCUSSION ON 29 JANUARY (SEE SEPTTEL), THE US REP COMMENTED THAT THE 30 JANUARY MEETING WITH THE SOVIETS WOULD BE SIMPLY A SOCIAL OCCASSION AND NOT AN INFORMAL WORK SESSION AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED. HE WOULD NOT PLAN TO TAKE UP THE PROCEDURAL ISSUE. HIS AIM AT THIS POINT WAS TO ALLOW THE SOVIETS TO REFLECT FURTHER ON THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR A PROCEDURAL UNDERSTANDING AND THEN

TO TAKE UP THIS ISSUE WITH THEM FURTHER.

9. THE CHAIRMAN, ASKED THE AHG FOR ITS OPINION ON THE SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT TWO PLENARY SESSIONS BE SCHEDULED PER WEEK, BUT THAT IN PRACTICE ONE PLENARY ONLY BE HELD EACH WEEK IF SPEAKERS WERE NOT SCHEDULED FOR THE OTHER SESSION. THE BELGIAN REP NOTED THAT HE WAS AGAINST THE USE OF A FORMALIZED CCD METHOD OF SCHEDULING PLENARIES. HE SAID THAT THE CCD SYSTEM OF PLENARY MEETINGS WAS NOT A GOOD PRECEDENT. BELGIUM WANTED PLENARIES BUT INSTEAD OF ACCEPTING SOVIET APPROACH, THE WEST SHOULD INSIST THAT THERE BE ONE PLENARY A  
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WEEK. IF THE CCD APPROACH WERE USED, THE RESULT MIGHT BE A SYSTEM OF ARTIFICIAL MEETINGS IN WHICH NO PARTICIPANT HAS ANYTHING TO SAY. THE UK REP COMMENTED THAT HE FOUND THE SOVIET REP'S ARGUMENT ON THIS POINT UNCONVINCING. HE SAID THAT NATIONAL CAPITALS WERE NOT JUDGING THE PROGRESS OF MBFR BY THE NUMBER OF PLENARIES THAT ARE HELD. AS FOR PUBLIC OPINION, HE REMARKED THAT NO ONE WILL NOTICE WHETHER THERE WERE ONE OR TWO PLENARIES HELD EACH WEEK. CONSEQUENTLY, HE WAS OPPOSED TO THE CCD SYSTEM OF HOLDING PLENARIES. THE ITALIAN REP AGREED WITH THE REMARKS OF THE BELGIAN AND UK REPS BUT POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIET REP WAS IN FACT PROPOSING A FACE-SAVING DEVICE SO THAT THE EAST COULD GIVE IN TO THE WESTERN PROPOSAL ON THIS MATTER. THE US REP NOTED THAT THIS INDEED APPEARED TO BE SOVIET MOTIVE AND COMPARISON WITH CCD PRACTICE IN OTHER RESPECTS WAS MISLEADING. THE CHAIRMAN THEN ASKED THE US REP TO FOLLOW UP ON THIS MATTER AT THE SOCIAL OCCASION SCHEDULED FOR 30 JANUARY.

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AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR/SHAPE

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 4 VIENNA 0848

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

10. THE CHAIRMAN TURNED TO THE QUESTION OF THE EASTER AND SUMMER RECESSES WHICH HAD ARISEN IN THE COURSE OF THE US-USSR BILATERAL. THE AHG AGREED THAT IT WOULD SCHEDULE ITS LAST MEETING BEFORE EASTER FOR 11 APRIL AND FIRST MEETING AFTER EASTER FOR 6 MAY, AND WOULD INFORM THE EAST THAT THE FIRST PLENARY AFTER EASTER SHOULD BE SCHEDULED FOR 9 MAY. THE BELGIAN REP SAID THAT HE WOULD TAKE UP MATTER OF SCHEDULING A POST-EASTER PLENARY WITH THE POLISH REP. IT WAS THE CONSENSUS OF THE AHG THAT IT WAS PREMATURE TO FURTHER DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF A SUMMER RECESS WITH THE EAST.

11. THE CHAIRMAN SAID THAT THE AHG SHOULD ADDRESS THE ISSUE WHICH AROSE IN THE COURSE OF THE US-USSR BILATERAL, THE QUESTION OF HOW THE WEST SHOULD PROCEED IN THE FACE OF APPARENT SOVIET OPPOSITION TO THE WESTERN SUGGESTION FOR MULTILATERAL INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS. THE NETHERLANDS REP OBSERVED THAT HE THOUGHT ONE POSITIVE POINT OF THE US-USSR BILATERAL WAS THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS SEEMED TO IN-  
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DICATE SOME WILLINGNESS TO TALK ABOUT US-USSR FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS. HE BELIEVED THAT THE SOVIETS' EMPHASIS ON BILATERALS WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE LINE TAKEN BY THE EAST IN THEIR PLENARY STATEMENTS. THE ALLIES SHOULD ASK THE SOVIETS HOW THEY INTENDED TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF EUROPEAN INVOLVEMENT IF THEY WANTED TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS ON A BILATERAL BASIS WITH THE US.

12. US REP SAID IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO PUSH THE SOVIETS ON THIS OCCASION ON THE ISSUE OF PURSUING THE NEGOTIATIONS ON A BILATERAL BASIS AT TIME WHEN SOVIETS INDICATED THEY WERE CONSIDERING THIS ISSUE FURTHER. UK REP SAID IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT ALLIES WISH TO BE REPRESENTED AS A GROUP AND WERE NOT INTERESTED IN SYSTEMATIC BILATERALS. NE NOTED BELIEF THAT MOSCOW, BELIEVING THE WEST IS IN A HURRY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, HAS APPAREN-

TLY APPROVED A VACATION FOR THE SOVIET REP (SEE VIENNA 0710) IN ORDER TO INDICATE THAT THE EAST IS NOT THE DEMANDEUR IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THE US DEP REP COMMENTED THAT THE SOVIET REP'S ANNOUNCED DEPARTURE FROM VIENNA AT THIS POINT SEEMED CLEARLY INTENDED TO BE SIGNAL THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH PRESENT STAT OF NEGOTIATIONS.

13. AHG NEED FOR GUIDANCE ON NEGOTIATED INSPECTION MEASURES. THE CHAIRMAN READ A TELEGRAM FROM THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL WHICH REQUESTED FROM THE AD HOC GROUP AN ESTIMATE AS TO WHEN THE GROUP WOULD REQUIRE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON INSPECTION AND VERIFICATION. THE TELEGRAM SPECIFICALLY ASKED IF SUCH INSTRUCTIONS WERE REQUIRED PRIOR TO THE EASTER RECESS. IT WAS THE CONSENSUS OF THE AD HOC GROUP THAT IT WAS TOO SOON TO TELL WHEN DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS WOULD BE NEEDED BUT THAT IN ANY EVENT IT WOULD NOT BE BEFORE THE EASTER BREAK. THE UK REP WENT ON TO SUGGEST THAT IN THE AD HOC GROUP RESPONSE SOME MENTION SHOULD BE MADE OF THE AHG NEED FOR A GENERALLY WORDED OUTLINE OF MAIN PROVISIONS OF STABILIZING MEASURES BY FEB 20.

14. THE UK REP OBSERVED IN THIS CONTEXT THAT BECAUSE OF THE UNACCEPTABILITY TO THE EASTERN SIDE OF WESTERN PROPOSALS FOR REDUCING THE FREQUENCY OF PLENARIES, THE AD HOC GROUP SCHEDULE OF TOPICS TO BE COVERED IN THESE PLENARIES WOULD HAVE TO BE EXPANDED. THE UK REP SUGGESTED THAT TOPICS SUCH AS: FLANK SECURITY; THE ALLEGED OBLIGATION OF ALL PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES FROM THE OUTSET; AND A SUMMARY STATEMENT OF THE ALLIED POSITIONS MIGHT  
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BE APPROPRIATE GAPFILLERS. HE ESTIMATED THAT THE FIRST ALLIED STATEMENT DEALING WITH STABILIZING MEASURE WOULD BE DELIVERED ON THE 28TH OF FEBRUARY. US REP RECOMMENDED THAT A GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS TO BE USED IN THE STABILIZING PRESENTATION SHOULD BE REQUESTED FROM THE SPC BY THE THIRD WEEK IN FEBRUARY. THE CHAIRMAN STATED THAT HE WOULD CIRCULATE A DRAFT OF HIS REPLY TO NATO HEADQUARTERS AT THE 31 JANUARY AHG MEETING.

15. THE AHG THEN TURNED TO A DISCUSSION OF THE PAPER SUBMITTED BY THE CHAIRMAN (B.G. STEIFF) OF THE MILITARY WORKING GROUP WHICH WAS CIRCULATED TO THE AGH ON 29 JANUARY. IN ADDRESSING THIS REPORT, THE UK REP AGREED WITH THE FIRST RECOMMENDATION, NOTING THAT THE REPORT SHOWS THE DIFFICULTY OF TALKING ABOUT DATA. HE REFERRED TO THE PROBLEM ASSOCIATED WITH THE USE OF THE 777,000 FIGURE FOR NATO MANPOWER. HE FURTHER STATED THAT IT WAS RATHER DISTRESSING TO HIM THAT THERE SHOULD BE A DISCREPANCY BETWEEN WHAT THE NATO MILITARY REPS BELIEVED TO BE AN ACCURATE COUNT OF NATO GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE NGA AND THE FIGURE THE AHG HAD USED IN PLENARY SESSIONS. THE UK REP STATED THAT IT WOULD BE MOST UNFORTUNATE IF, FOR THEIR OWN REASONS, NATO MILITARY REPS WERE TO RELEASE INFORMATION WHICH SHOWED THAT NATO HAD A HIGHER NUMBER

OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE NGA THAN THE WESTERN REPS HAVE STATED OFFICIALLY TO THE EASTERN REPS AT THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. NEEDLESS TO SAY, HE WENT ON, THE WEST WOULD BE EMBARRASSED OF THE EASTERN SIDE COULD CLAIM THAT THERE HAD BEEN A BUILD-UP OF 20,000 PERSONNEL ON THE WESTERN SIDE IN A THREE-MONTH PERIO\*. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT, WHILE THE UK HAS BEEN CONVINCED THAT THE WEST OUGHT TO TRY TO ENCOURAGE THE EASTERN SIDE IN A DISCUSSION OF DATA, HE BELIEVED THAT THE AHG WOULD HAVE TO TAKE A VERY CAREFUL LOOK AT THE MECHANISM FOR DOING THIS AND THAT THE ALLIES WOULD HAVE TO AGREE ON THE DATA AMONG THEMSELVES.

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ACTION ACDA-19

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1436

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

16. THE BELGIAN REP NOTED THAT THE PROBLEMS OUTLINED BY THE UK REP WERE VERY REAL ONES. HE SAID THAT THE FIGURE OF 777,000 SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE USED IN THE MBFR CONTEXT BECAUSE THERE IS NO DANGER OF CONSIDERING DATA EXCHANGE WITH THE EASTERN SIDE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE CANADIAN REP STATED THAT HE HAD FIRM INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE AHG SHOULD NOT



USE ANY DATA ON GROUND FORCES UNLESS IT HAS BEEN CLEARED WITH NATO. THE US REP AGREED WITH THE UK REP AND BELGIAN DEPREP THAT THE AHG SHOULD FIND OUT THE FIGURES FIRST AND THEN DECIDE HOW TO HANDLE THE DATA PROBLEM AND THAT AT THIS TIME THE ALLIES MUST STAY WITH THE 777,000 TOTAL FOR NATO FORCES IN THE NGA. THE US REP SUGGESTED THAT THE MILITARY WORKING GROUP DRAFT A MESSAGE TO AN APPROPRIATE BODY IN BRUSSELS TO ASK FOR THE FIGURE OF CURRENT NATO GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE NGA. THE US REP STATED HIS BELIEF THAT ONE OF THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE DATA INCONSISTENCY MAY BE THE FACT THAT IN SECRET

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SOME MANPOWER COUNTS, ACTUAL MANNING LEVELS ARE BEING USED, WHEREAS IN OTHER MANPOWER COUNTS AUTHORIZED MANNING LEVELS ARE USED. HE WENT ON TO NOTE THAT SOME WELL FORMULATED QUESTIONS FOR BRUSSELS MIGHT GIVE THE AHG A BETTER PICTURE OF THE ACTUAL SITUATION. THE I.M.S. REP OBSERVED THAT HE HAD ALREADY QUERIED HIS OFFICE IN BRUSSELS REGARDING THE DATA DISCREPANCY AND HE EXPECTED AN ANSWER SHORTLY; BUT IT WOULD BE WISE FOR THE AHG TO USE ITS OWN CHANNELS AS WELL. IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE MILITARY WORKING GROUP WOULD DRAFT A TELEGRAM TO BRUSSELS ON BEHALF OF THE AHG AND CIRCULATE THIS DRAFT FOR AHG REVIEW ON 31 JANUARY.

17. THE US REP STATED THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO RESERVE ON THE US POSITION ON PACT FIGURES FOR 1968 AS CONAINED IN THE MWG REPORT. HE NOTED THAT THE 1973 FIGURES HAD BEEN BASED ON AN INTENSIVE REVIEW OF THE AVAILABLE DATA. SUCH AN INTENSIVE REVIEW HAD NOT BEEN APPLIED TO THE 1968. CONSEQUENTLY, IT WAS PROBABLE THAT THERE HAD NOT BEEN AS GREAT A PACT BUILD-UP BETWEEN 1968 AND 1973 AS INDICATED. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD ASKED WASHINGTON FOR GUIDANCE ON THIS ISSUE.HUMES

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